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The humanities, like most academic disciplines, face questions of popular and 
public perception. The sciences, for instance, increasingly attract challenges, 
sometimes of dubious validity, from passionate advocates of so-called ‘deep 
ecology’ outside the academy, and from postmodern science studies within it. 
Educationists worldwide face growing discontent with the quality and 
character of public education. Anthropologists fend off endemic charges of 
political incorrectness while struggling with the possible demise of their 
discipline. The fine arts have become inured to occasional ugly public 
confrontations and persistent bland dismissal by majority opinion. The 
humanities, it seems, are not alone in feeling the need to clarify their relations 
with the public. Some of the needed elucidation is trivial, but deserving of 
wide public dissemination, debate and consideration: for instance, the 
vocational contribution of the humanities is often misunderstood. Other 
matters are more fundamental. They have to do with understanding the value 
of the humanities in relation to the cultural formation of human beings.   
 
In South Africa the humanities stand in particular need of winning broader 
public acceptance and support because they are repositioning themselves in 
what is in significant respects a new country. Internal scrutiny and revision 
need to be accompanied by renewal of public understanding, both with 
regard to potential recruits to the disciplines (students and their parents, for 
instance) and in terms of the value placed on the humanities by employers 
and decision-makers in society. 
 
Vocationalism 
 
Let us begin with the trivial. It is often said that the university is the natural 
home of those who seek answers to the big questions. Well, here are some big 
questions: 
 
 The science graduate asks, ‘Why does it work?’ 
 The graduate in accounting asks, ‘How much will it cost?’ 
 The management graduate asks, ‘When can you have it ready?’ 
The humanities graduate asks, ‘And will it be French fries or a jacket 
potato?’ 
 
The apocryphal charge here is that the humanities are all very well, but they 
don’t put supper on the table. They don’t lead to satisfying and lucrative 
careers. This is a very common public perception, especially in South Africa 
where the newly enfranchised middle classes are keen to consolidate their 
financial position, while those who anticipate the pressure of redress and 
affirmative action policies want blue-chip international career qualifications 
to protect them from policy-weighted competition. 
 
How valid is the perception?  
 
Confronting the issue in their own particular context, the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council of Canada set out to demonstrate to society at 
large, and those who carry weight in the central economy in particular, that 
the humanities are in fact a good social investment. The Council 
commissioned a well-respected economist from the University of British 
Columbia, Robert Allen, to study the impact of investment in the Social 
Sciences and Humanities on the country’s economic viability in the global 
arena. He produced two reports (Allen 1998, 1999), and some of his key 
findings were as follows: 
 
 Graduates in humanities and social sciences readily find jobs 
and generally earn high incomes (according to data obtained from 
Statistics Canada) 
 
 The unemployment rate among university graduates in 
humanities and social sciences aged 25-29 is significantly lower (5.8%) 
than the unemployment rate among graduates of technical, vocational 
or career programs (findings based on 1991 census data) 
 
 Most graduates in humanities and social sciences are employed 
in a professional or managerial capacity (50-80%). That is compared to 
60% of counterparts with university degrees in commerce and 23-35% 
of individuals with technical or vocational diplomas 
 
 Cost-benefit analysis shows the rate of return to society as       
follows: 
 
Education (10%) 
Social sciences (9%) 
Engineering (7.9%) 
Humanities (7.8%) 
Maths and the physical sciences (7.4%) 
 
 All university programs analysed in the report in terms of their 
costs and benefits yield a social rate of return that exceeds the real 
interest rate in Canada today. 
 
These economic analyses were accompanied by other measures. For instance, in 
support of the findings, a meeting of 15 chancellors of universities in the province 
of Ontario issued a statement on the value of the Liberal Arts: 
 
The liberal arts and sciences must continue to be a seminal part of 
Ontario’s higher education. This is a practical idea as well as a 
philosophical one. A number of recent studies have clearly underlined 
that a well-rounded, general education – learning to think, to write and 
to express one’s ideas clearly – is as valuable to future employability as 
technical or technological training. 
(http://www.trainyourbrain.ca/english/supporters/chancellors.html) 
 
Perhaps carrying more weight in relevant quarters than the views of the 
chancellors (which might, of course, be interpreted by sceptics as merely self-
serving conservatism), was an associated statement put out by 30 CEO’s of 
leading Canadian Hi-tech companies in which they affirmed, ‘We stand with the 
chancellors of Ontario’s universities.’ Their document urges: 
 
Yes, this country needs more technology graduates, as they fuel the 
digital economy.  But it is impossible to operate an effective 
corporation in our new economy by employing technology graduates 
alone. We have an equally strong need for those with a broader 
background who can work in tandem with technical specialists, 
helping create and manage the corporate environment. 
 
A liberal arts and science education nurtures skills and talents 
increasingly valued by modern corporations. Our companies function 
in a state of constant flux. To prosper we need creative thinkers at all 
levels of the enterprise who are comfortable dealing with decisions in 
the bigger context. They must be able to communicate – to reason, 
create, write and peak – for shared purposes: For hiring, training, 
managing, marketing, and policy-making. In short, they provide 
leadership. 
            (http://www.trainyourbrain.ca/english/tools/ceo.html) 
 
Clearly, these CEOs are no apologists for irrelevancy, ‘fuddyduddy-ism’ or 
aristocratic, leisure-class values. They are arguing in the best interests of their 
companies, as part of a concerted campaign to counter popular misperceptions 
concerning the value of the humanities to the Canadian economy. 
 What about South Africa? 
 
This is no doubt heartening for advocates of the humanities; but that was 
Canada, this is South Africa. In the years immediately following our transition to 
democracy, Canada was ranked first in the United Nations’ Global Human 
Development Ratings: South Africa stood at ninety-third (Africa Institute 1996: 24).1 
Might there be grounds for comparison? Would similar findings emerge here?  
 
The late Jacob Bronowski, well-known for his contributions to the public 
understanding of science, put forward with admirable lucidity his view that the 
kind of society humanity seeks to create is identical with one which enables the 
work of science (and the arts) to proceed. He writes: 
 
As a set of discoveries and devices, science has mastered nature; but it 
has been able to do so only because its values, which derive from its 
method, have formed those who practise it into a living, stable and 
incorruptible society. Here is a community where everyone has been 
free to enter, to speak his mind, to be heard and contradicted - - - 
 
The society of scientists is simple because it has a directing purpose: to 
explore the truth. Nevertheless, it has to solve the problem of every 
society, which is to find a compromise between man and men. It must 
encourage the single scientist to be independent, and the body of 
scientists to be tolerant. From these basic conditions, which form the 
prime values, there follows step by step a range of values: dissent, 
freedom of thought and speech, justice, honour, human dignity and 
self-respect. 
Our values since the Renaissance have evolved by just such 
steps. 
       (74-75) 
 
      Let us accept, for the sake of argument, Bronowski’s idealistic description of 
science and the community of scientists, and fully acknowledge the tremendous 
achievements of science, associated with the pursuit of these values. For all its 
omissions and exclusions, the kind of society portrayed by Bronowski is 
attractive both to those who adhere to creative exploration as a primary human 
motivation (mainly the well-to-do), as well as those for whom the increasingly 
widespread satisfaction of basic human needs is of primary importance.  
 
Yet can it plausibly be argued that the stable, ordered society science needs to 
make its optimal impact will result primarily from a concentration on science or, 
more mundanely, on maths, science and technology in general public education? 
Science (as opposed to scientists) has very little to say about how human life 
should be lived, even by implication. Secondly, the serious pursuit of scientific 
knowledge has always been a minority undertaking, and the delicious 
puritanism celebrated by Bronowski is undermined at every point by human 
nature. Truth-seeking is compromised by self-aggrandisement, lack of initiative, 
cultural dissonances, wayward appetites, untoward psychological complexities, 
sloth, factionalism, poverty, dogmatism and stupidity – all the regrettable 
variations that complicate (and embellish) human experience. Material progress 
alleviates some of these features and aggravates others, but in all societies, the 
true scientific proclivity is a minority interest, even among those equipped 
merely to make use of scientific findings, and who rely on them in their daily 
work and other interests. 
 
Bronowski has, in important respects, got it wrong. Science depends for its very 
survival upon the creation of a society which respects the values of science and 
permits them to thrive, and that can only be a society in which the values of the 
humanities have taken root, are constantly reviewed and renewed, and are 
shared by the overwhelming majority of the citizenry. It could plausibly be 
argued that this country needs the humanities even more than a society like 
Canada. Consider, as one example, the AIDS crisis in South Africa: the belated 
response to the situation, the culpable delays, the fatuous controversy over anti-
retrovirals and their provision to sufferers. Is this crisis the result of scientific 
failure? No, the science is there. The crisis has been the result of poor leadership, 
political obfuscation, power-plays, cultural regression, lack of social integration 
and poor, under-trained governmental bureaucracy. Similarly in the local 
government environment: it is not paucity of maths and science education that 
challenges programme delivery; it is the poverty of middle-order leadership, the 
inability to delegate effectively, the lack of initiative and capacity in ordinary civil 
and bureaucratic functions. The planning is often in place, but the general level of 
education and its social orientation is inadequate to make effective use of it. 
 
In addressing such shortcomings a key misapprehension is the assumption that 
because the country is desperately short of scientists and technologists, maths 
and science must be an absolute priority in our schooling system. This is to 
mistake the part for the whole. The fact is that many children – not only South 
African children – because of innate disposition, home background or poor 
education, are light-years from the possibility of attaining a marketable 
competence in maths or science2, yet they may be highly intelligent and suited to 
a great many useful, even exalted, functions in government and the economy. 
Given good teaching, they can learn to think well and searchingly about deep 
issues that plague contemporary society. It does not take profound mathematical 
understanding to read a balance sheet, or even to lead a large corporation. 
Statistical projections, financial control and scenario-planning are service 
functions, not necessarily leadership tasks. Yet the myth is steadily propagated 
that mathematical intelligence, more so even than scientific literacy, is what 
South Africa needs. This is a harmful distortion. Of course we need 
mathematicians and scientists, as many as we can produce, but unaided they will 
not be able to deliver the kind of society in which we all want to live. There are 
no scientific solutions to the problems of underdevelopment and civic education, 
only important ancillary contributions. Science functions optimally in a 
democratic, relatively stable and wealthy society. On its own, science is 
powerless to create such conditions. These conditions are attained and sustained, 
not through science, but in societies that are absorbing at depth the lessons of the 
humanities. 
 
People want to believe that because science and technology are integral to 
modern developing economies, such economies will develop if only sufficient 
emphasis is placed on maths and science in the education system. In fact, the 
sequence has to be reversed. The conditions of stable governance, effective 
bureaucracy, adequate infrastructural maintenance, basic skills development, 
and responsible social services are pre-conditions for the adequate functioning of a 
scientific and technological culture. Well-educated scientists obviously acquire 
and exercise their civic imaginations in support of such conditions, but it is more 
than likely that the products of an education system that marginalizes or 
travesties the humanities will fail both science and society. 
 
The upshot of this realization, if decision-makers could be persuaded to look it in 
the face, implies, not a down-grading of the emphasis on science and technology, 
but a much closer and more concerned look at what teachers in schools and 
universities are doing with the humanities. Successful socio-economic and 
cultural development requires a conscious balance between the sciences and 
humanities, and it is far from certain that humanities education in South Africa is 
sufficiently strong and healthy to carry its share of the burden. 
 
Here we come to the second challenge. Do humanities practitioners in South 
Africa have adequate answers to the questions society is implicitly (and 
sometimes explicitly) putting to us? Can scholars in the humanities explain their 
contribution to the public good? 
 
Vocationalism in the university 
 
Let us start by considering the humanities in the universities. This after all is 
where much of the understanding that gradually works its way through the 
schools and into society originates. One of the first things advocates of the 
humanities would need to make clear to interrogators is the character of a 
university education as distinct from a purely vocational one. It is not the 
existence or otherwise of a more or less direct linkage to specific career 
opportunities that determines whether or not such an education can be described 
as vocational, but the character of the education undergone. 
 
The distinction may be characterized as follows. A vocational education 
transmits a particular range of knowledge, ideally in its current, up-to-date state, 
in a mode designed to relate it most nearly to a context of application in society. 
So, accounting studies emphasize principles and best practice in relation to the 
legal and policy framework pertaining today, and the present state of the South 
African business and corporate environment. It is of course possible to teach 
accounting at different levels of complexity, finesse and specialization, but there 
is little incentive to move the subject away from its severely practical orientation. 
PhDs in accounting are rare.  
 
With management, the situation shifts slightly, in that a range of management 
theory will normally be explored, emanating from diverse situations, and whose 
applicability becomes very much a matter of contextual judgment. It is certainly 
possible to earn a PhD in management studies, but the subject matter is likely to 
edge towards issues that belong in the social sciences and humanities proper. The 
paradigmatic qualification in business studies is the MBA, a programme 
designed to develop cutting-edge managers and business leaders for different 
contexts, and among the entry requirements is typically a substantial period of 
practice. This stipulation is there to ensure adequate integration of theory and 
practice in the educational process. Law has the potential to move fully into the 
university paradigm, in that practical legal training can be (and, depending on 
the level of qualification, should be) supported by rigorous emersion in the 
history and philosophy of law. In fact, it would be difficult to conceive of 
adequate legal practice emerging from an academic culture divorced from the 
humanities. 
 
It should be apparent, then, that while many popular career options can be 
placed along a continuum running between the poles of the narrowly vocational 
and the so-called purely academic, it is always the degree of emphasis placed on 
the ‘other-than-vocational’ component that qualifies the programme for inclusion 
in the domain of true tertiary study. When we turn to the core disciplines 
comprising the humanities, the connection with a specific profession or career is 
weak or absent (unless transmission and extension of the discipline itself comes 
to be counted as such). True, there is often a loose affiliation between the 
humanities and vocations such as librarianship, teaching, advertising, writing 
and publishing, but the connection is not intrinsic or necessary. This fact in itself 
can be problematic, because students whose thinking is constrained by the 
vocational paradigm, whether through the influence of parents or other social 
pressures, will tend to define the value of a humanities degree solely in terms of 
particular vocational outcomes. 
 
‘Text’ versus ‘language’ 
 
If then, humanities undergraduates are not preparing directly for a vocational 
career, what are they doing? And why aren’t they preparing directly for a career?  
I want to answer, first, in terms similar to those proposed by Michael Oakeshott 
(1967: 308-312). The paradigmatic distinction is that between knowing a text and 
learning a language. A university discipline expresses a particular mode of 
enquiry, one ‘language’ in the array of languages that makes up the intellectual 
capital of humanity. Each particular language of enquiry is embodied in a vast 
array of performances in these languages – good, bad and indifferent – 
performances that we might call ‘texts’. Vocational education exhausts itself in 
knowing particular texts, and these texts are chosen because they are current and 
relevant in the world of practice and application. Learn the text, become expert in 
it, and you’ve attained the end of vocational education. Once you leave the 
educational institution – let’s hope it doesn’t call itself a university – you may 
lack experience (though, as has been indicated, many vocational programmes 
strive to incorporate work experience so as to minimise this gap), but you are, or 
should be, ready to perform the text or texts you have learned, this time in the 
workplace arena. 
  
Because of the rapidity of social change, your text, or range of texts, will soon 
become redundant, out-of-date, and then you must learn additional texts. You 
trained in servicing VWs, now you must learn Renaults. You learned to 
programme Fortran and Basic, now you must master C++ and XML. You studied 
Management by Objectives, now you must re-shape your style to fit transnational 
corporate policy. You will gain broader experience, you will always be learning, 
but what you will be learning is text after text after text – and thoroughly 
necessary and rewarding the experience may well prove to be. 
 
The point of higher education from the outset is to learn the language. In higher 
education, texts are studied not simply for their own sake, but for what we can 
learn from this study about the mode of enquiry of which they are a good 
example. In other words, texts are treated as emblematic of some aspects of the 
language, and we choose the particular texts we study as part of a higher 
education because they are in a proper state to yield insight into the language 
they exemplify (Oakeshott: 314). Our object of study is not only the text but the 
language, and, usually at graduate level, we go on to reach towards a language of 
languages, which we might call philosophy. 
 
 
The ‘swerve’ from higher education 
 
The distinction between ‘text’ and ‘language’ on which I am harping, is rather 
mysterious and fascinating. Consider this. In order to appreciate, say, Hamlet, I 
must know the language. In order to know the language, I must read Hamlet. The 
apparent circularity is embarrassing, and the sort of thing that tends to 
compromise the humanities in the eyes of the uninitiated. M.A.K. Halliday 
explores the distinction between text and language – and it is fundamental to the 
mission of the humanities in general no less than Halliday’s particular discipline 
of linguistics – by means of an illuminating analogy: 
 
- - - the analogy whereby language is to text as climate is to weather is 
useful to think with. It reminds us that these are not two different 
things, or rather what we call ‘climate’ and what we call ‘weather’ are 
the same phenomenon seen from different angles, or different 
moments of time, and so it is with language and text - - - much 
misunderstanding has been caused by counterposing these two terms, 
with language and text being treated as if they were different orders of 
reality. 
 
He goes on to point out a significant limitation to the analogy: 
 
Like all analogies, it’s very partial. It’s an abstract tool for thinking 
with, not a strict proportion, because semiotic systems are not like 
physical systems. In particular, an instance of a semiotic system carries 
value; instances of physical systems do not. Of course you may prefer 
one kind of weather to another, but that’s got no relevance whatever to 
the status of an instance of that weather in relation to climate: it’s just 
something to be observed and measured like any element. But a text 
has its own value, not necessarily, in fact, probably not usually, fixed 
and determinate - - - And the relation of the discourse value to the 
underlying system is in fact highly complex. I refer to this as the 
‘Hamlet factor’. 
(Halliday 2001, transcr. Kilpert)  
 
A good teacher of the humanities must know the language the text under 
discussion instantiates, and must be able to move the student from reading ‘text’ 
to exploring ‘language’, to reveal the distinctiveness of text in relation to the 
homologies and contrasts available in the language. Some texts disturb, redefine, 
modify the language in which they are formed. They have a perennially evolving 
afterlife. In the broad historical perspective of cultural ‘climate’ they remain 
instances of ‘weather’ that are of intrinsic and perennial interest. This is what 
Halliday means by the ‘Hamlet factor’. Indeed, not altogether coincidentally, to 
the best of my knowledge, Hamlet is the only literary work to have a fully-fledged 
academic journal devoted to its study.3 
 
Ignorance of the distinction between text and language, and all that it implies, is 
symptomatic of the kind of confusion that influences well-intentioned but 
ignorant tertiary institutions to swerve from true higher education towards 
reductive vocationalism disguised as higher education. What can philosophy do 
that society values? Aha! – ‘critical thinking’. Right, let’s forget about philosophy 
and teach critical thinking. What useful outcome can we expect from the 
literature student? Aha! – ‘communication skills’. Right, let’s forget literature and 
teach communication skills. And so the reduction goes on, relentlessly 
impoverishing the tertiary environment, the individual student and society, in 
the name of relevance, vocationalism, contextualised learning, public 
accountability (in the shallowest of senses) and all the other misnomers that 
disguise a lack of educational understanding. 
 
Why we still need the humanities today 
 
Each of us is born into a relatively narrow life-world. This is as true for those 
fortunate few who enter upon the human scene embraced by sheltered luxury as 
it is for the many who expend their years in poverty, far from the seats of wealth, 
power or influence. Moreover, the character of the world as it impinges on the 
individual is changing rapidly, everywhere. (This statement is probably valid 
even for those who strive most to avoid the world, such as those who spend their 
time in religious retreat.) What this suggests is that ordinary means of social 
transmission, where values, attitudes and judgments are passed from generation 
to generation within the family, or from mentor to ‘apprentice’ in society, are no 
longer adequate or may prove so only in the most exceptional of cases. These 
processes may still be necessary, indeed fundamental, to individual human 
development, but they cannot be sufficient. Rapid technological change and the 
shifts in values that result, increasing mobility, population growth, the 
communications and information revolutions, the differential impact of social 
change on pre-established world views – in fact all the clichés of the globalizing 
world – add up to an uncertain field of potential experience for the individual. 
The resources of the family, even in optimal or exceptional circumstances, are 
insufficient to interpret, let alone adequately to evaluate, this complexity, 
especially since it is increasingly likely that the individual’s activities and 
proclivities will shift to arenas and predicaments beyond the experience of the 
senior generations. 
 
This is where the educational potential of the humanities becomes such a 
powerful resource. By exposing students to detailed study of particular artifacts – 
works of literature, examples of fine art, philosophical systems, political 
prescriptions, musical compositions, social theories – we avail them of the 
opportunity to form and test their own judgments, to challenge received opinion, 
to argue positions within a community of informed discussion and debate, to 
think and re-think their views in the company of major artists and diagnosticians, 
each of whom has put their work forward for exactly this purpose, namely, to 
help shape and re-shape human beings. The power of critical thought, trained 
and developed in this manner, is central to the formation of a creative democratic 
citizenry anticipated, for example, in South Africa’s White Paper of 1997.4 As a 
society, we need the formal space of the humanities in which to engage with a 
full range of estimates concerning human potential, past and future. In the course 
of such studies students will also, no doubt, learn to think clearly and write well, 
but this is incidental. The mission of the humanities is to mould human identity 
and purpose in relation to changing times and circumstances. No other field of 
enquiry, not science, not sociology, not established religion, can meet this 
imperative need quite as well. 
 
Some will claim never to have felt such a need, or to have abandoned it for ‘the 
real world’ after fleeting initiation at school or university. For these, the 
humanities are so much frippery, a merely decorative intellectual surplus, or 
shallow entertainment which ignores the imperatives of the way the economic 
world works. Such people intend to stick to the ‘text’ they inherit, and perform it 
unthinkingly to their own best advantage. The abject misery of thousands, 
though it seems melodramatic to say so, comes to rest on the shoulders of those 
who have reached this conclusion. 
 
The founding impulse of the humanities 
 
To counter such views from a fons et origo, we might go back to a period before 
the Romans, before Plato even, to the founding moment of the humanities. It is 
commonplace to acknowledge, as do scientists and everyone other than 
proponents of ethno-science, that science arose once only on planet earth, among 
the ancient Greeks (Wolpert 25).5 It is less commonly acknowledged that the 
western humanities, too, rose at a particular moment among the Greeks, though 
in all probability similar moments passed unrecorded in other cultures. The 
originary impulse is expressed (or invented) during Socrates’ famous discourse 
in the Apology, as recorded and fictionalized by Plato: 
 
If I tell you that this is the greatest good for a human being, to engage 
every day in arguments about virtue and the other things you have 
heard me talk about, examining both myself and others, and if I tell 
you that the unexamined life is not worth living for a human being, 
you will be even less likely to believe what I am saying. But that’s the 
way it is, gentlemen, as I claim, though it’s not easy to convince you of 
it.         
 (Apology 38a, trans. Nussbaum 1) 
 
‘The unexamined life is not worth living for a human being’ (emphasis mine): 
‘that’s the way it is.’ This is the bald standpoint of the humanities expressed in a 
nutshell, and it is not the easiest position to justify to defenders of the status quo, 
either inside or outside the academy. Let’s look at some of the issues. Why was 
Socrates on trial for his life? He was teaching that the young ought to devote time 
and intelligence to finding satisfactory arguments to justify their beliefs, rather 
than simply following those of their parents and the civic authorities. Not even 
the gods were to be exempt from rational enquiry. Aristophanes, in his comedy 
The Clouds, viewed Socrates as dangerously subversive of orthodox education, 
which he took to be a process whereby the young are indoctrinated in the 
traditions and values of their culture, as is the case in traditional societies 
everywhere. In other words, for Aristophanes education meant learning the text 
of your society. Not so with Socrates. He wanted people to study the language of 
humanity, though he recognized that this was no easy matter.  
 
We are back to the relation between ‘text’ and ‘language’? Socrates held that by 
systematically questioning text, probing it from all possible perspectives, 
exploring alternatives, we may by degrees arrive at the language, or at least 
important elements of it. It is important to stress, ‘from all possible perspectives,’ 
because Socrates was also an early advocate of truly democratic learning. He was 
willing to engage in philosophical discussion with anyone and everyone, in the 
hope that they might know more than he did, or contribute something uniquely 
valuable. Plato, by contrast, wanted to restrict radical questioning to an élite who, 
through philosophical investigation, would gain access to timeless truths, 
enabling its members to rule justly over the masses. Here we have the origin of 
the tension between the humanities as a source of élite leadership – the Platonism 
of government and corporate management – and the humanities as a democratic 
investigation of human meaning and value.6  
 
Socrates was utterly serious in his claim for intensive rational enquiry as essential 
to discovering a true mode of living, the good life. The unexamined life is fit only 
for something less than a human being. Those who unthinkingly follow tradition, 
who defend and reproduce text uncritically, are trapped in what Wittgenstein 
might call a ‘form of life’ (241). Plato likened it to living imprisoned in a cave, 
pursuing a troglodyte existence ruled by convention and fear of the unknown 
(Republic Book 7). It is interesting to speculate that the tame Platonic ‘puppet 
show’ may have primitive origins in the image of early humans huddled in 
solidarity round a fire, the cave walls patterned by flickering shadows, their 
shapes shifting and unaccountable, while outside lie unknowable dangers, not to 
be faced in the dark, and largely indecipherable within the cave despite the 
artificial fire-light. It is a potent representation of fear.  
 
Those venturing forth on the intellectual scramble to seek the source of the 
shadows (to find truth) must be prepared to risk themselves on two counts: first 
in view of what they might find outside, and second on account of what their 
fellow humans might do to hold them to the text that currently governs behavior 
in the cave. Those leaving the enchanted circle may not return. Those remaining 
have to learn to tolerate the courageous quest of those who ‘go beyond,’ and to 
deal with the emotional disturbance and communal risk involved. We know 
what happened to Socrates. We worry that today’s South African society, focused 
wholly on instrumental programmes directed to immediate ends, will not have 
the courage, vision or knowledge to support the quest. 
 
The public good 
 
It is vital to recognise that Socrates was not of the view that the cave and its 
occupants should be abandoned. He acknowledged his social responsibilities. For 
Socrates, rational critique did not entail social alienation. He had such 
overwhelming respect for the intent of human governance that he suffered its 
judgment rather than compromise his view of human purpose. He wouldn’t 
accept the option of banishment from the polis and he didn’t run away. He 
likened democratic society to a noble but lazy horse, content to meander along 
rather than rise to its true potential. Democracy needs the gadfly of rational 
critique, tough argument and unrelenting debate, in order to realize its true 
nature (Apology 30e). There was in Socrates none of the unsympathetic arrogance 
that sections of the academy today routinely pour on the preoccupations and 
tastes of ordinary people. Neither, on the other hand, did he elevate the inanities 
of popular culture to major significance. This idea of the humanities as a bold 
venturing beyond the limits of orthodoxy and convention, as a form of 
responsible critical creativity focused on the needs of humanity, sits uneasily 
with the tame, inert teaching that characterizes so much of what students at 
school and in tertiary education today experience as education in the humanities.  
 
These studies are, or should be, concerned with value and meaning; for 
individuals, for societies, for humanity – for other life forms and (however odd it 
may seem to say so) for the universe. They work in a certain way. No scientist 
today anticipates that coming generations, with the exception perhaps of 
historians of science, will read his or her latest paper. Science will have moved 
on; the position reported in the paper will have been incorporated into general 
scientific understanding, its contents accepted, rejected, modified or surpassed. 
No anthropologist expects to pass moral judgment on the practices and belief 
systems of the peoples studied – at least not as a professional. The humanities, 
however – and this is their unique claim – invite us to respond in person to value 
as ‘value-for-us’, to meaning as ‘meaning-for-us’, and to do so by paying 
intelligent attention to specially created ‘texts’ or artifacts: literary works, 
paintings, installations, dramatic performances, historical theses, philosophical 
analyses, social theories, and so forth. Despite their contingency and historical 
conditioning – sometimes just because of these factors – such artifacts are to be 
directly experienced and responded to (Nozick 620). This activity, 
conscientiously pursued, shapes our ethical, cultural and political outlook. Hence 
it is that we must explore the historically situated text of Hamlet in order to arrive 
at its contribution to the language of humanity; but we also need to know 
something of the language of humanity in order to explore the text of Hamlet.  
 
The values and meanings precipitated by a creation like Hamlet are not in any 
simple way portable, extractable, translatable or conveyable by other means (that 
is why theory can only be tangentially useful in responding to art and literature). 
Writers, artists – and here I include historians and philosophers – as well as 
performers, intend not only that value and meaning should be conveyed by their 
work, but that this work in itself should be valued as a special means of working 
upon ourselves and our societies, an ongoing resource for debate and the 
transformation of value and meaning. The worry contemporary society has with 
the humanities is really a suspicion that they may be just a matter of narrow self-
development, private judgment, aesthetic sophistication, armchair praxis, the 
cultivation of an effete world of imagination that disdains the common good. 
Society thinks that way either because it hasn’t studied the humanities, or it went 
to the wrong university. (Listen to Socrates on this latter subject: ‘if your children 
were colts or calves,’ he says to a prominent citizen, ‘you would make sure you 
found a really high-quality trainer for them’ (Apology 19d). His point is that if the 
training of mere livestock elicits such care, so much more should the complex 
matter of whom we are to trust with our children’s education call forth our 
deepest attention.) 
 
Conclusion 
 
By way of illustration, I want to conclude this brief fragment of discussion (only a 
fragment, because the continuing conversation of the humanities is rewardingly 
comprehensive) by foregrounding a meditation from long ago by a well-
educated humanities student known to generations of readers and theatre-goers, 
who is exploring exactly the issue before us: the individual intellect and 
sensibility in its relation to the public good. It goes like this: 
 
 ‘To be, or not to be – that is the question - - -‘ 
 
Yes, his name is Hamlet. I’m sorry to contradict many of the great readings and 
performances of this speech, from Sir Laurence Olivier down, but this is not the 
poetic rendering of a passionate young romantic on the verge of suicide. Hamlet 
is using his academic training in the humanities to explore his troubling 
predicament. The speech is put in the form of a scholastic colloquy, a formal 
university debate.7 In such colloquies, the question is first formally put to the 
debaters; then one side has a go, followed by the other: 
 
 ‘To be, or not to be – that is the question: 
 
 [The question has been ‘put’] 
 
 Whether ‘tis nobler in the mind to suffer 
The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, 
 
[That’s the one side] 
 
Or to take arms against a sea of troubles, 
And by opposing end them?’  
 
[That’s the other] 
     (3.1.57-61) 
 
‘To be, or not to be’: Hamlet’s quandary is not simply the choice of whether to 
exist or not to exist; ‘Shall I stay alive or kill myself?’ His problem has to do with 
value, with nobility and reputation: ‘Whether ’tis nobler - - -.’ He’s asking the 
question the humanities face moment by moment, the question of value, the 
question of our own relation to the public good. Can his knowledge – his 
knowledge of the true state of Denmark – stay within, ‘in the mind’, and he still 
be ‘noble’? Is he noble merely by the accident of birth, or does nobility mean a 
way of conducting oneself in the public arena, even if it means sacrificing one’s 
own life? Can he live with an ignoble self that rejects the call of the public good? 
Will his investigations and doubts portend nothing for the outside world? Or, 
will he boldly, intelligently, perhaps desperately, ‘take arms against a sea of 
troubles, /And by opposing end them’. It is the question Socrates faced centuries 
before, the question the humanities in the university must always face. 
 
The ambiguity of referent in the word ‘opposing’ is hugely significant. In one 
sense it refers to the act of turning the dagger (the ‘bodkin’) upon himself (1.3.77). 
In another it evokes the mad act of rushing dagger in hand against the waves, an 
evidently futile attack in which the sea is sure to win – a different form of self-
immolation. Attack himself, or attack the problem? Or shall we say, attack 
himself and his future reputation by not attacking the problem? What a choice! 
Why not just stay quietly suffering the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, 
obsequiously and privately?  
 
On the one hand, we have passive ineffectual suffering, a sequestered nobility of 
intent that can be ratified only in the mind; on the other nobility in deed, perhaps 
equally ineffectual, but one that claims a place in public record. Will he attempt 
to end his country’s troubles, or will he merely end himself? If he does nothing, 
he ends, not his existence, but his life as the best human being he is capable of 
becoming. Will he make truth public, or comfort himself that, though it remains 
locked inside, he knew it all along? 
 
Hamlet makes the choice any good prince must make, and in doing so he sides 
with classical conduct, educated wisdom and virtue, over early modern 
interiority. He takes up arms, and dies trying to sort out Denmark’s sea of 
troubles. Indeed, to the extent that the advent of young Fortinbras augers well for 
the future, he may have succeeded. But the image of the all-conquering sea is a 
warning to naïve utopians that many of humanity’s problems stem not from 
homo politicus as such, but from the fact that homo politicus is rooted in the 
chthonic maelstrom of nature. We’re here to reach a sustainable accommodation 
with nature, because we can do nothing else. And we can’t really do it on our 
own. The good means ‘the public good,’ our collective achievement of civility in 
the open cosmos of nature.  
 
‘To be, or not to be’ should be read as Shakespeare’s reflection on the death of 
Socrates. Hamlet (the character) isn’t a fictional personality to be psychoanalysed. 
He is a poetic and dramatic representation of humanity. We overhear 
Shakespeare pondering the nature of the public good, as he overhears Plato 
pondering Socrates’ demonstration of it. Perhaps our students, some of them, 
will overhear us, and they in turn will be helped when the time comes for them 
to supply an answer to the abiding question of the relation between the 
humanities and the public good: The unexamined life is not worth living -  ‘To be, or 
not to be - - -?’ That is the way it is. 
 
Institute for the Study of English in Africa 
Rhodes University 
 
NOTES 
1. Canada’s Human Development Index (HDI) was 0.932; South Africa’s, 0.65 
(0.462 for black South Africans). The HDI is based on longevity, knowledge 
(adult literacy rate, mean years of schooling), and the standard of living. 
2. The crisis was well illustrated in the Third International Mathematics and 
Science Study-Repeat which surveyed the maths and science proficiency of 
Grade 8 learners. South Africa came last out of 38 participating countries (see 
Howie, 2001). 
3. Hamlet Studies (Delhi, India). 
4. This opening statement from the 1997 White Paper is crucial: 
 PURPOSES OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
1.2 Higher education has several related purposes: 
 It meets the learning needs and aspirations of individuals through the 
development of their intellectual abilities and aptitudes. It equips 
individuals to make the best use of their talents and of the 
opportunities offered by society for self-fulfilment. Higher education is 
thus a key allocator of life chances. 
 It provides the labour market, in a knowledge-driven and knowledge-
dependent society, with the high-level competencies and expertise 
necessary for the growth and prosperity of a modern economy. It 
teaches and trains people to fulfil specialised social functions, enter the 
learned professions, or pursue vocations in administration, trade, 
industry and the arts. 
 It is responsible for the socialisation of enlightened, responsible and 
constructively critical citizens. Citizenship of this nature presupposes a 
commitment to the common good, but it also implies a reflective 
capacity and a willingness to review and renew prevailing ideas, 
policies and practices. 
 It is directly engaged in the creation, transmission and evaluation of 
knowledge. Its purpose is to ensure the continued pursuit of academic 
scholarship and intellectual inquiry in all fields of human 
understanding, through research and teaching. 
5. Wolpert reaches this conclusion by deploying a rigorous distinction between 
science and technology (25-34). Relax the distinction (improperly in my view), 
and so-called ‘science’ becomes a baggy but much more inclusive category. 
 
6. This point is central to Karl Popper’s argument about the origins of 
totalitarianism. 
 
7. I am grateful to Professor Iain Wright of the Australian National University at 
Canberra for this insight. 
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